Borrowing from the Future: 401(k) Plan Loans and Loan Defaults by Lu, Timothy Jun et al.
University of Pennsylvania 
ScholarlyCommons 
Wharton Pension Research Council Working 
Papers Wharton Pension Research Council 
4-2015 
Borrowing from the Future: 401(k) Plan Loans and Loan Defaults 
Timothy Jun Lu 
Peking University, junlu@phbs.pku.edu.cn 
Olivia S. Mitchell 
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, mitchelo@wharton.upenn.edu 
Stephen P. Utkus 
Vanguard, steve_utkus@vanguard.com 
Jean A. Young 
Vanguard, jean_young@vanguard.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Lu, Timothy Jun; Mitchell, Olivia S.; Utkus, Stephen P.; and Young, Jean A., "Borrowing from the Future: 
401(k) Plan Loans and Loan Defaults" (2015). Wharton Pension Research Council Working Papers. 84. 
https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/84 
The research reported herein was performed pursuant to a grant from the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA), 
funded as part of the Retirement Research Consortium. The authors also acknowledge support provided by the 
Pension Research Council/Boettner Center at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, and the 
Vanguard Group. Programming assistance from Yong Yu is also appreciated. Opinions and conclusions expressed 
herein are solely those of the authors and do not represent the opinions or policy of the SSA, any other Federal 
agency, or any institution with which the authors are affiliated. Opinions and errors are solely those of the authors 
and not of the institutions providing funding for this study or those with which the authors are affiliated. © 2014 
Jun, Mitchell, Utkus, and Young. All rights reserved. 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/84 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 
Borrowing from the Future: 401(k) Plan Loans and Loan Defaults 
Abstract 
Tax-qualified retirement plans seek to promote saving for retirement, yet most employers permit pre-
retirement access by letting 401(k) participants borrow plan assets. This paper examines who borrows 
and why, and who defaults on their loans. Our administrative dataset tracks several hundred plans over 5 
years, showing that 20% borrow at any given time, and almost 40% do at some point over five years. 
Employer policies influence borrowing behavior, in that workers are more likely to borrow and borrow 
more in aggregate, when a plan permits multiple loans. We estimate loan default “leakage” at $6 billion 
annually, more than prior studies. 
Keywords 
retirement plan loan, retirement wealth, household debt, loan default, consumption, buffer-stock 
Disciplines 
Economics 
Comments 
The research reported herein was performed pursuant to a grant from the U.S. Social Security 
Administration (SSA), funded as part of the Retirement Research Consortium. The authors also 
acknowledge support provided by the Pension Research Council/Boettner Center at the Wharton School 
of the University of Pennsylvania, and the Vanguard Group. Programming assistance from Yong Yu is also 
appreciated. Opinions and conclusions expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not 
represent the opinions or policy of the SSA, any other Federal agency, or any institution with which the 
authors are affiliated. Opinions and errors are solely those of the authors and not of the institutions 
providing funding for this study or those with which the authors are affiliated. © 2014 Jun, Mitchell, Utkus, 
and Young. All rights reserved. 
This working paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/84 
Borrowing from the Future: 
401(k) Plan Loans and Loan Defaults 
Timothy (Jun) Lu, Olivia S. Mitchell, Stephen P. Utkus, and Jean A. Young 
April 2015 
PRC WP2014-01 
Pension Research Council Working Paper 
Pension Research Council 
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 
3620 Locust Walk, 3000 SH-DH 
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6302 
Tel: 215.898.7620 Fax: 215.573.3418 
Email: prc@wharton.upenn.edu 
http://www.pensionresearchcouncil.org 
The research reported herein was performed pursuant to a grant from the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA), 
funded as part of the Retirement Research Consortium. The authors also acknowledge support provided by the Pension 
Research Council/Boettner Center at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, and the Vanguard Group. 
Programming assistance from Yong Yu is also appreciated. Opinions and conclusions expressed herein are solely 
those of the authors and do not represent the opinions or policy of the SSA, any other Federal agency, or any institution 
with which the authors are affiliated. Opinions and errors are solely those of the authors and not of the institutions 
providing funding for this study or those with which the authors are affiliated. © 2015 Jun, Mitchell, Utkus, and 
Young. All rights reserved. 
All findings, interpretations, and conclusions of this paper represent the views of the authors and not those of the 
Wharton School or the Pension Research Council. © 2015 Pension Research Council of the Wharton School of the 
University of Pennsylvania. All rights reserved. 
Borrowing from the Future: 
401(k) Plan Loans and Loan Defaults 
Abstract 
Tax-qualified retirement plans seek to promote saving for retirement, yet most employers permit 
pre-retirement access by letting 401(k) participants borrow plan assets. This paper examines who 
borrows and why, and who defaults on their loans. Our administrative dataset tracks several 
hundred plans over 5 years, showing that 20% borrow at any given time, and almost 40% do at 
some point over five years. Employer policies influence borrowing behavior, in that workers are 
more likely to borrow and borrow more in aggregate, when a plan permits multiple loans. We 
estimate loan default “leakage” at $6 billion annually, more than prior studies. 
Keywords: retirement plan loan; retirement wealth; household debt; loan default; consumption; 
buffer-stock 
JEL Codes: D14, D04, D09, H24, J2 
Timothy (Jun) Lu (corresponding authors) 
Peking University – HSBC Business School 
Room 725, Peking University Campus, University City, 
Shenzhen 518055 
Email: junlu@phbs.pku.edu.cn 
Olivia S. Mitchell 
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 
3620 Locust Walk, 3000 SH-DH 
Philadelphia, PA 19104 
Email: mitchelo@wharton.upenn.edu   
Stephen P. Utkus 
Principal 
Vanguard Center for Retirement Research 
100 Vanguard Boulevard 
Malvern, PA 19355 
Email: steve_utkus@vanguard.com 
Jean A. Young 
Senior Research Analyst 
Vanguard Center for Retirement Research 
100 Vanguard Boulevard 
Malvern, PA 19355 
Email: jean_young@vanguard.com  
2 
Borrowing from the Future: 
401(k) Plan Loans and Loan Defaults 
I. INTRODUCTION
Defined contribution (DC) retirement plans in the U.S. generally are accorded 
tax-deferred status as a means to encourage saving for old age,1 yet most plans also include 
liquidity features giving workers pre-retirement access to their money.2 The tax code typically 
discourages such pre-retirement access by imposing a tax liability and an additional 10 percent 
penalty tax on amounts withdrawn early. Nevertheless, estimates of aggregate premature 
withdrawals (so-called account “leakage”) from all tax-deferred accounts, including both 401(k)s 
and IRAs, amount to 30-45 percent of annual total contributions (depending on the economic 
environment; Argento, Bryant, and Sabelhaus, 2015). Such sizeable outflows relative to inflows 
raise the important question of how these liquidity features may influence future retirement 
security.  
A few recent papers (Li and Smith, 2010; Beshears et al., 2012) have examined the 
demographic and financial aspects of 401(k) borrowers, but no previous study has explored how 
employer loan policy affects participant behavior and consequent default outcomes. This is 
notwithstanding the fact that most DC participants in the U.S. have the option of borrowing from 
their retirement accounts.3 Accordingly, here we address several questions regarding borrowing 
from retirement accounts. First, we ask whether and how participants’ borrowing patterns 
1 Here we use the terms “DC plan,” “401(k) plan,” “retirement plan,” and “pension plan” interchangeably. More 
than 88 million private sector workers are covered by DC retirement plans holding more than $3.8 trillion in assets 
(U.S. Department of Labor, 2013). 
2 Pre-retirement liquidity mechanisms include hardship withdrawals (the worker can access his own contributions 
under limited conditions); certain types of non-hardship withdrawals (e.g. the withdrawal of employer profit-sharing 
contributions); and full access to savings on termination of employment with the current employer. Hardship and 
non-hardship withdrawals and loans are at the prerogative of the plan sponsor; they are generally subject to income 
tax and a 10 percent penalty tax though there are exemptions to the penalty.   
3 In total, around 90 percent of plan participants had access to plan loans, and one-fifth of active workers had 
outstanding loans (in 2011; Vanderhei et al., 2012).    
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respond to different loan policies. Second, we investigate who defaults on plan loans, and how 
this pattern is related to employer loan policy. And finally, we offer our thoughts on the 
implications for retirement security of allowing 401(k) loans.  
Drawing on a rich administrative dataset of 401(k) plans containing information on plan 
borrowing and loan defaults, we demonstrate that retirement account loans are quite common, 
with 20 percent of DC participants having an outstanding loan at any point in time, and nearly 40 
percent borrowing over a five-year period. Prior research has suggested that the availability of 
plan loans encourages higher retirement plan contributions by making tax-deferred retirement 
accounts more liquid (Mitchell, Utkus, and Yang, 2007). Yet by law, participants must repay 
their 401(k) loans on a set schedule, usually through payroll deduction, and we estimate that 
fully 90 percent of loans are repaid in a timely way. Yet one in 10 loans is not repaid – failure to 
repay typically occurs when the worker leaves his current employer – and such loan “defaults” 
represent a permanent reduction or “leakage” from retirement savings.4 We also show that 
employer loan policy has a sizeable effect on 401(k) borrowing. When a plan sponsor permits 
multiple rather than only one loan, each individual loan tends to be smaller; this is consistent 
with workers taking a buffer-stock approach, retaining the option to borrow more in case of 
future consumption shocks (Carroll, 1992).5 At the same time, the probability of plan borrowing 
nearly doubles, and the aggregate amount borrowed rises by 16 percent, suggesting that 
employees perceive that easier loans are actually an encouragement to borrow (i.e., an 
“endorsement effect”). It is possible that firm loan policy might reflect endogenous differences in 
credit demand across groups of workers, so we undertake several tests to rule out such 
                                                 
4 Inasmuch as 401(k) loans are a way people access their own saving, there is no technical “default” as with a 
conventional loan from a bank or other intermediary.   
5 As Carroll (1992:62) stated: “consumers hold assets mainly so that they can shield their consumption against 
unpredictable fluctuations in income.” 
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endogeneity. Plan loan interest rates are generally low and have no significant impact on 
borrowing behavior.  
Turning to defaults, we find that a vast majority – 86 percent – of employees who leave 
their jobs with a plan loan outstanding do default, exposing them to both penalty and any income 
tax due. Workers at firms allowing multiple loans have default rates that are higher by 1.7 
percent points. Participants having only a single loan when multiple loans are allowed are 2.2 
percent less likely to default, compared to workers in plans allowing a single loan, suggesting 
some underlying heterogeneity in credit demand. We also consider whether the economic 
turmoil of 2008-09 dramatically changed 401(k) plan borrowing and default patterns. This turns 
out not to be the case: in fact, participants were less likely to borrow during the downturn, and 
default rates remained stable. This could have been because voluntary job changes fell during the 
recession, so defaults declined; this seems to have offset higher involuntary job loss rates. 
Finally, we use our results to estimate an aggregate effect of 401(k) loan defaults on 
retirement savings. Our leakage figure totals around $6 billion due to loan defaults per year, a 
value far larger than prior estimates which relied on incomplete data.6 Nevertheless, this is still 
an order of magnitude lower than retirement plan leakage due to account cash-outs on job 
change, which the GAO (2009) reported at $74 billion in 2006. The small relative size of loan 
defaults is relevant to the question of whether retirement leakage should be further restricted 
(Leonard, 2011).  
In what follows, Section II provides an overview of 401(k) loan rules, and Section III 
reviews related studies. Section IV describes the data and develops our hypotheses. In Section V 
we present empirical results on borrowing, and in Section VI we provide results on loan defaults. 
                                                 
6 GAO (2009) estimated plan loan defaults at $561 million for the tax year 2006. Yet that estimate relied on data on 
“deemed distributions” of loans representing a small fraction of actual loan defaults. We say more on this below. 
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Section VII reports our estimate of the aggregate tax revenue impact of loan defaults, and 
Section VIII concludes. 
 
II. 401(K) LOAN RULES 
Borrowing from tax-qualified 401(k) plans is permitted under U.S. Treasury regulation 
governing loans, repayment, interest rates, and defaults, along with associated tax and penalty 
consequences.7 A 401(k) loan is not a credit instrument in the conventional sense, but rather an 
arrangement allowing the plan participant to gain access to his retirement accumulations under 
certain conditions. First, the participant may only borrow up to half of his account balance, with 
a maximum loan of $50,000 (in nominal terms). Second, the participant must agree at the time of 
the loan to replenish the withdrawn funds plus interest in accordance with a standard flat-dollar 
amortizing loan schedule, typically through payroll deduction.  
Plan sponsors also may impose their own requirements on plan loans, including whether 
401(k) loans are permissible at all, although as a practical matter, 90 percent of active 
contributors have access to loans. Sponsors may also determine the number of individual loans 
allowed, whether loans must be for some minimum amount (e.g., $1,000), and what the 
participant must pay in terms of an interest rate. In general, plan and regulatory rules interact as 
follows: if a 401(k) plan offers a loan feature with a minimum required loan amount of Lmin, the 
participant with an account balance W401k seeking to borrow loan amount L must satisfy two 
conditions: 
  and  
 $50,000. 
                                                 
7 See GAO (2009) for additional background on regulations and laws for 401(k) loans. 
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For a typical Lmin = $1,000, a participant will not be eligible to borrow until such time as his 
account reaches or surpasses $2,000; at that point, he may borrow up to half of his account 
balance. The 50 percent limit will be binding until the participant’s account balance exceeds 
$100,000; above that, the maximum withdrawal amount cannot exceed $50,000. If a plan only 
allows one loan, a borrower must fully repay the current loan outstanding before she can take 
another plan loan. Some plan sponsors permit participants to take out multiple loans (some 
permitting two, others allow three or even more) in increments L1, L2, and so on, with ∑ . 
In those cases, borrowers can hold as many loans as the plans permit at a time, given that the 
total amount of outstanding loans do not exceed the cap described above. 
Tax rules require a series of loan repayments PMT according to a schedule given by 
∑  where the loan interest rate is i and n refers to the number of periods over which 
the loan must be repaid.8 The loan repayment is taken from the participant’s after-tax salary. A 
portion of the payment stream represents principal repayment while the other part represents 
interest. Loan interest payments are unlike the traditional cost of credit, in that the participant is 
effectively repaying himself; hence, a higher interest rate leads to more rapid replenishment of 
borrowed funds. The payments are deposited to the participant’s account as if they were pre-tax 
plan accruals. In exchange for agreeing to these repayment terms, the participant can spend 
pre-tax L on consumption with no immediate income tax consequences. In other words, when the 
plan loan is exercised, the participant avoids paying current taxes as well as an early withdrawal 
penalty on the amount withdrawn from his pre-tax retirement account. Li and Smith (2010) show 
                                                 
8 Most loans are general purpose, with a maximum loan term of 60 months. Loans for purchase of a principal 
residence, which require documentary evidence of a home purchase, have a maximum term of 360 months.  
Interest rates are set according to the terms of the plan.  
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that, in most circumstances, the opportunity cost of a 401(k) loan will be less than the cost of 
paying all interest to a financial institution.9 
When the borrower leaves his job, any remaining balance due on a 401(k) loan, Lbal, 
typically converts to a balloon payment. If a plan borrower leaves his job and does not repay Lbal 
within 60-90 days, the participant loan is considered in default and is reported to the IRS as a 
taxable distribution from the plan at that time, resulting in tax liability Lbal(τ+.1). In other words, 
the 10 percent penalty is imposed on the amount borrowed if it is not returned to the account. It 
is worth noting that τ 0 for many low- and middle-income households today, due to a variety of 
tax credits, so the expected cost of default may be simply 0.1Lbal.
10 
Because 401(k) loans are not conventional borrowing arrangements but rather represent 
withdrawals from one’s own savings, they are not subject to credit underwriting and not reflected 
on credit reports. Accordingly, a 401(k) loan can be a convenient way of accessing credit, 
particularly for the credit-constrained. Moreover, loan defaults have no credit reporting 
consequences, and defaulting on a 401(k) loan has no effect on a borrower’s ability to take a new 
loan from a new plan.  
 
III. PRIOR STUDIES  
Saving and borrowing from a 401(k) plan is usefully examined against the broader 
literature on the impact of tax-advantaged retirement saving on total saving.11 Focusing just on 
                                                 
9 Lu and Tang (2014) compare different types of loans using scenario analysis, and find that, under reasonable 
assumptions, a 401(k) loan is typically less costly than a credit card loan. 
10 The rules on loan issuance and repayment are somewhat more complex than summarized here. For example, the 
plan sponsor can also limit borrowing. Also the period for repaying a loan can vary by plan but cannot exceed the 
end of the calendar quarter following the quarter in which the participant terminates employment. Some employers 
also allow repayment of loans from participant bank accounts during the loan period or on job termination. 
Participants usually have the right to repay a loan balance at any time. 
11 For instance, Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995) find that most 401(k) contributions represent net new saving. Both 
Benjamin (2003) and Gelber (2011) report that people eligible to participate in company 401(k) plans save more 
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401(k) plans, several prior studies have examined aspects of borrowing behavior. Work by the 
GAO (1997) concluded that allowing plan loans can raise both participation and contribution 
rates, while others have observed that making loans available influences savings mainly on the 
intensive margin, in the form of higher DC plan contribution rates (Munnell, Sunden, and Taylor, 
2001/02; Holden and Vanderhei, 2001; Mitchell, Utkus, and Yang, 2007). In a survey of about 
900 DC plan participants, Utkus and Young (2011) reported that about 40 percent of borrowers 
used plan loans for bill or debt consolidation, while over 30 percent used them for home 
improvement and repair. They also found that the least financially literate borrowers used 401(k) 
loans for consumption rather than investment purposes. Using the Survey of Consumer Finances, 
Sunden and Surette (2000) and Li and Smith (2010) found that people who borrowed from their 
401(k) accounts had higher DC account balances, but they also had lower total financial assets, 
higher debt, and were more credit-constrained. In a study related to ours, Beshears et al. (2012) 
used participant-level information to show that plan borrowing followed a hump-shape age 
profile. That analysis did not evaluate defaults nor the role of employer policy on behavior as we 
do in what follows.12  
In a distinct but related context, Gross and Souleles (2002a, 2002b) examined credit card 
borrower behavior. They concluded that their sample exhibited “buffer stock” behavior: that is, 
they tended to not borrow the maximum so as to leave a margin in case of emergency. That study 
reported credit card interest rates averaging 16 percent, compared to, for example, an average 
401(k) loan interest rate of just over seven percent (in our dataset about which we say more 
                                                                                                                                                             
inside and outside their retirement plans. Using Danish data, Chetty et al. (2014) found little evidence of crowd-out 
for the 85% of the population they deemed passive decision-makers, who saved more when they shifted employers 
with higher automatic contributions.   
12 A related body of work considers the use of lump-sum distributions from 401(k) plans, whether penalized or not; 
see Basset, Fleming and Rodrigues (1998), Burman, Coe and Gale (1999), Burman, Coe, Dworsky and Gale (2012), 
Sabelhaus and Weiner (1999), and Amromin and Smith (2003).  
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below). Such a large difference in borrowing rates suggests that employees with access to plan 
loans might benefit from substituting lower-cost 401(k) loans for much higher-cost credit card 
debt. Somewhat surprisingly, Li and Smith (2010) reported that many people held substantial 
credit card debt even when a plan loan would have been less expensive. Those authors suggested 
that this seemingly illogical behavior could be shaped by financial advisers’ negative views of 
401(k) loans,13 along with a mental accounting perspective, namely that 401(k) accounts might 
be thought of as restricted for retirement purposes rather than to be used for current 
consumption.14,15 
 
IV. DATA AND HYPOTHESES  
A. Data 
 Our analysis uses a rich administrative dataset for DC plan participants covering the 
five-year period July 2004--June 2009.16 The dataset includes 882 different 401(k) (or similar) 
DC plans. To assess the propensity to borrow, we use a time-varying sample of over 900,000 
participants observed monthly, with over 55 million observations. In this sample, we observe on 
average over 13,000 new plan borrowers each month (or a total of 780,000 borrower 
observations). Variables available include plan characteristics and participant 
demographic/financial characteristics. We also observe information on loan default behavior for 
workers terminating employment.  
                                                 
13 Suze Orman, host of CNBC’s “The Suze Orman Show” has been quoted at stating “It makes no sense in any 
circumstance to take a loan from a 401(k)” (Jansing, 2013). 
14 Financial literacy may also play a role: using survey data, Utkus and Young (2011) found that workers with lower 
levels of financial literacy were more likely to borrow from their DC accounts. Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) discuss 
how financial illiteracy influences retirement savings. 
15 In non-pension settings, Ayres and Nablebuff (2013) have argued that it is optimal for young people to buy stocks 
on margin. Hurst and Willen (2007) found that young households were sufficiently constrained that permitting them 
to use Social Security wealth to pay off debt could be welfare-enhancing. 
16 The data were provided by recordkeeper Vanguard under restricted access conditions, and the identities of 
individual firms and plan participants are masked.  
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In any given month, an average of 1.38 percent of eligible participants took a new loan in 
our data (Table 1). The average amount borrowed was just over $7,800 (in $2010), with a 
median of nearly $4,600; the mean total amount borrowed was around $10,000, with a median of 
about $5,900. Loan interest rates varied by plan, though many plans peg the interest rate to the 
Prime Rate plus one percent. Loan interest rates were only modestly higher for borrowers than 
for the entire participant sample. The average age of borrowers was 42, slightly younger than the 
average participant; borrowers had about eight years of tenure and somewhat lower income, 
lower non-retirement financial wealth, and half the plan account balance compared to all 
loan-eligible participants. Borrowers were also more likely to be in plans where multiple loans 
were allowed. During the period of the global financial crisis, defined here as September 
2008-June 2009, fewer participants borrowed from their retirement accounts.  
Table 1 here 
Figure 1 illustrates the monthly and cumulative percentage of loan-eligible participants 
having one or more outstanding loans. A first observation is that about 20 percent of active 
participants had a loan outstanding in any given month, so the loan origination rate was 
approximately offset by the rate of loan repayments or defaults. Over the entire five-year period 
of our study, the cumulative proportion of participants borrowing from their retirement plan rose 
to nearly 40 percent. In other words, instead of the same participants taking repeated plan loans, 
many different participants eventually borrow from their retirement accounts over a longer time 
horizon.   
Figure 1 here 
We are also interested in the impact of employer plan design on participant borrowing. 
Figure 2 presents the mean proportion of new plan borrowers over the five-year period, where 
11 
 
 
we compare plans offering only a single loan at a time, with those permitting multiple loans. 
When only one loan was allowed, an average of 1.10 percent of eligible participants took a new 
loan each month. With multiple loans, the average rose to 1.69 percent per month.   
Figure 2 here 
B. Hypotheses 
 We seek to examine how plan loan policies influence plan borrowing and default 
patterns. As noted above, the buffer-stock model suggests that cautious borrowers will remain 
just below the maximum borrowing limit to protect against future consumption shocks. In a 
401(k) setting, participants will be restricted by employer policy regarding both the number of 
loans allowed at one time, and the total amount that can be borrowed. In our dataset, 40 percent 
of plans covering 52 percent of participants permitted workers to take out two or more loans at 
once. In such cases, buffer-stock participants would be predicted to be more likely to borrow 
from their plan, but take smaller loans, compared to patterns in plans permitting only a single 
loan. We also hypothesize that the availability of multiple loans could be seen as an employer 
“endorsement” of plan borrowing (Benartzi, 2001). If this were true, we would anticipate that 
aggregate borrowing would be higher when multiple loans are permitted.  
    Permitting multiple loans may or may not affect default behavior at job termination. On 
the one hand, default behavior depends only on whether the borrower can pay off his outstanding 
balance, regardless of how many loans he has taken. In that case, there may be no relationship 
between defaults and multiple loans. On the other hand, taking multiple loans could indicate lack 
of self-control or inability to manage one’s finances. If so, those who took several loans might be 
more likely to default. 
12 
 
 
Employers also have control over another plan feature that may affect borrowing 
behavior: the interest rate that workers must pay when borrowing from their plans. Yet the effect 
of the interest rate is complex, since a higher interest rate makes the loan costlier to the worker, 
while a higher interest rate boosts the worker’s retirement account more quickly. Ultimately, 
which effect dominates is an empirical question.  
Another issue we explore is whether plan borrowing and loan default rates changed 
materially during the financial crisis of 2008-09. With respect to borrowing, the predicted impact 
is ambiguous: on the one hand, employees may have become more cautious and borrowed less, 
but on the other hand, they might have sought additional loans due to financial insecurity or 
household financial shocks. Regarding defaults, there are again two potentially competing 
effects: voluntary job changes would be expected to decline during a recession, reducing the 
incidence of default. Yet involuntary job losses rise, raising the risk. Again, empirical analysis is 
required to discern the net effect.  
In addition to our focus on the most relevant employer plan design features, we are also 
able to control on several demographic and financial factors that could affect plan borrowing and 
default behavior. Naturally age is important, as borrowing would be expected to be higher among 
the credit-constrained young and then decline with age. Yet in 401(k) accounts, borrowing is 
conditioned on the employee’s account balance which rises with both age and salary. Therefore 
we would anticipate a hump-shared age profile for borrowing (as in Beshears et al. 2012) since 
the ability to borrow rises with age and salary, but the demand for plan borrowing falls with age. 
Li and Smith (2010) have also noted that liquidity-constrained households are more likely to rely 
on 401(k) borrowing. Using our much more extensive dataset, we examine the robustness of this 
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finding. Moreover we hypothesize that liquidity constraints are also more likely to associate with 
loan defaults on job termination, since the outstanding balance accelerates as a balloon payment.  
 
V. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF 401(K) BORROWING AND LOAN AMOUNTS  
To investigate borrowing patterns from 401(k) accounts we use a multivariate model of 
the following form:  
BORROWi,j,t = δ + α’ PLANj + β’ PARTICIPANTi,j +’MACROt + i,j,t 
where BORROWi,j,t refers to a vector of several outcomes including the probability of borrowing, 
the size of new loans, and the total amount borrowed by the ith participant in the jth plan in 
month t. We examine all loan-eligible participants, defined as those having assets at least twice 
the minimum loan amount set by the plan and not otherwise subject to any other IRS or plan 
limit (whether in terms of dollars or number of loans allowed). The PLANj vector includes a flag 
for whether the plan permitted multiple loans, the loan interest rate, and plan size (number of 
participants); The PARTICIPANTi vector refers to participant characteristics including age, sex, 
job tenure, income, account balance, and non-retirement household wealth.17 We also control on 
the employer’s main industry. The MACROt vector controls for the lagged three-month average 
state-specific unemployment rate, and a flag indicating the financial crisis period (September 
2008-June 2009).18 Finally, we cluster observations at the plan level for robust standard errors.19 
A. Factors Determining Borrowing from the Plan 
                                                 
17 Due to data limitation, we do not observe participants’ education levels; Utkus and Young (2011) and Li and 
Smith (2010) find that higher educated individuals are less likely to take plan loans. 
18When a participant defaults on an outstanding loan, the default is typically recorded at the end of the quarter 
following the quarter in which the job termination occurs. We therefore use the prior three-month average 
unemployment rate at the state level as a regressor, lagged by a month. We also experimented with a simple 
three-month lagged unemployment rate, the one-month lagged rate, and the current month rate as robustness checks, 
with results similar to those reported below. We provide a detailed description of all explanatory variables in 
Appendix Table 1. 
19Computer limitations preclude clustering at the participant level for the entire sample. When we do so for a subset 
of observations as a robustness check, results are similar to those reported here. 
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Our first dependent variable captures the probability of a participant taking a new loan in 
month t, estimated using Probit as indicated in Table 2. The mean value of the dependent 
variable is 1.4 percent per month. The basic model in Column 1 is supplemented in Column 2 
with interactions between multiple loan availability with participant demographics. In both cases, 
the particularly salient plan feature is the ability to take more than one loan at a time. 
Specifically, if a plan sponsor allowed employees to take out multiple loans, the probability that 
participants took a new loan rose by 2.7 percentage points. Since the mean probability of taking a 
new loan was 1.4 percent, allowing multiple loans boosted the loan take-up rate by twice.  
By contrast, the employer-determined loan interest rates had no material effect on 
borrowing patterns. Our dataset includes wide dispersion in interest rates (the low was 1.8 
percent and the high was 11.5 percent), so this result seems quite robust. We therefore conclude 
that 401(k) loan demand is fairly insensitive to the price of a plan loan, due to the interplay from 
lower take-home pay due to a higher interest rate for the loan repayment, versus faster account 
replenishment via a higher interest rate.   
Table 2 here  
Other results in Table 2 are also of interest. As hypothesized, participants were more 
likely to borrow from their 401(k) plans when they earned lower incomes, had fewer 
non-retirement financial assets, and had a lower plan account balance. These are likely the most 
liquidity-constrained participants. There is also an inverted U-shape age pattern by age, with 
participants age 35-44 more likely to borrow compared to their younger and older peers, 
consistent with prior studies. Moreover, shorter-tenured workers were also less likely to borrow, 
suggesting that familiarity with the loan feature and ability to borrow grew with job tenure and 
time in the plan.  
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One concern voiced by policymakers is that plan borrowing might have ramped up 
during the financial crisis; nonetheless, our evidence suggests otherwise. That is, during the 
turmoil, participants were 41 percent less likely to take new loans (0.6 percentage points).20 One 
reason might be that plan borrowing is often tied to home purchases and improvements (Utkus 
and Young, 2011). Given the housing market precipitated the financial crisis, this effect could 
explain why 401(k) borrowing fell. 
Table 2 also helps us examine which participants were likely to be affected by key plan 
features. Column 2 shows that, in plans allowing multiple loans, younger and less senior 
participants were more likely to boost their probability of borrowing. Specifically, participants 
under age 35 (our reference category) were 50 percent more likely (than the mean, or 0.7 
percentage points) to borrow from their plans when multiple loans were permitted. Furthermore, 
if an employer allowed more than one loan, participants with low household income (<$35,000) 
were 29 percent (0.4 percentage points) more likely to borrow from their own accounts, versus 
those with medium household income ($35,000- $87,500, the reference category). In other 
words, permitting multiple loans disproportionally induces young and low-income participants to 
borrow more. 
Overall, plan loan policies appear to have a strong impact on participants’ borrowing 
behavior. Permitting multiple loans boosts loan take-up rates dramatically, and these increases in 
borrowing are especially influential for young and lower-income individuals. 
B. Determinants of Loan Size  
Next we turn to the intensive margin of borrowing, examining both the size of new loans 
and the aggregate value of plan borrowing. Table 3 reports estimation results using multivariate 
                                                 
20 This confirms simulation results from Vanderhei et al. (2012) who, using a different dataset, observed that loan 
activity did not change much over the period 1996-2011. 
16 
 
 
ordinary least squares (OLS) models. Columns 1-2 examine the size of new loans (in natural 
logs) with a mean of 8.42 (or $4,532). Columns 3-4 focus on the total amount borrowed (in 
natural logs) with a mean of 8.66 (or $5,785). Because we control on participants’ 401(k) 
account balances, these results should be interpreted as the relative proportion borrowed from 
participant accounts.   
Table 3 here  
Previously we showed that plans allowing multiple loans increased the probability of 
borrowing. This again was a significant determinant of the amount borrowed. When the 
employer permitted multiple loans, each individual loan was smaller by 19 percent (see Column 
1).21 This finding is directly supportive of the buffer stock hypothesis, where participants seek to 
maintain some unused loan capacity as protection against future consumption shocks. When a 
participant has the option of taking another loan, he is more likely to preserve the buffer in his 
account to keep the borrowing option open. Here, again,  the plan loan interest rate is not 
statistically significant.  
Mirroring the loan incidence results, we again find a hump-shaped pattern with age for 
loan amounts, with the largest loans (as a fraction of account wealth) taken by participants age 
35-44. Although less likely to borrow in the first place, the better-off (those with higher income 
and more non-retirement financial assets) were more likely to take larger loans. One reason may 
be that better-off households have greater non-plan resources to repay their loans, and so they 
would be more willing to borrow. Another possibility is that better-off households may 
understand that 401(k) loan interest rates are generally more favorable than 
commercially-available borrowing rates. We also find that those with little non-retirement wealth 
were less likely to borrow more from their 401(k) plans. The financial crisis did not affect loan 
                                                 
21 The log mean of 8.419 declines by -0.207; in linear terms, the mean of $4,532 declines to $3,685 or 19 percent.  
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amounts, suggesting that, conditional on the lower borrowing rates during the crisis, proportions 
borrowed remained the same. State-specific unemployment rates had negligible effects. 
Coefficient estimates on the factors associated with participants’ aggregate loan size are 
provided in Columns 3-4 of Table 3. Most strikingly, the availability of multiple loans raised 
aggregate borrowing by 16 percent in Column 3, in contrast to our earlier finding that individual 
loans were smaller under this plan provision.22 This difference does suggest that the availability 
of multiple loans could serve as an employer “endorsement effect” (Benartzi, 2001): that is, 
employees may perceive the chance to take multiple loans as reflective of employer 
encouragement to do so. The age pattern of loans also differs in this column compared to 
Column 1: in multiple-loan plans, participants age 35+ were likely to borrow 11 percent more 
than younger participants. In other words, when plan sponsors permitted multiple loans, younger 
workers took out more (Column 2), but those age 35+ borrowed a higher fraction of their 
retirement wealth (Column 4).  
C. Endogeneity Tests 
   An alternative explanation for the effect of loans limits on borrowing might be that the 
result reflects endogenous credit demand.  That is, some firms might attract employees with an 
inherently higher demand for credit (due to lifecycle reasons or behavioral biases), and so they 
might offer a 401(k) plan with multiple loan features to attract such individuals. For example, an 
employer anticipating that its workers might need small frequent loans might be more likely to 
adopt a multiple-loan policy. In such a case, the positive correlation between participant 
borrowing and the number of plan loans allowed would reflect plan sponsor  anticipation of 
worker borrowing needs, rather than workers’ reactions to loan features. 
                                                 
22 The log mean of 8.663 rises by 0.150; in linear terms, the loan value grows from $5,785 to $6,721, or 16 percent. 
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While we cannot completely rule out this possibility, we have undertaken several 
additional analyses to test for robustness. If plan sponsors did, in fact, set loan policy in 
anticipation of participant needs, we might expect that plans allowing multiple loans would differ 
systematically from single-loan plans according to key characteristics. By contrast, if differences 
in borrowing behavior were due to participants reacting independently to plan loan policies, there 
should be no systematic differences across plans. To test this hypothesis, we run the following 
OLS regression:  
MULTI_LOAN,j = δ + α’ PLAN_CHARj + ,j 
Here the dependent variable takes the value of one if the plan allowed its participants to hold 
multiple loans, and 0 if it allowed only a single loan. The PLAN_CHARj vector consists of plan 
and plan participant characteristics including the plan mean and standard deviation of 
participants’ age, tenure, household income, financial wealth, the plan loan interest rate, the 
number of participants in the plan, and controls for the firm’s industrial sector. Our hypothesis is 
that there should be no statistically significant difference in observable characteristics between 
plans allowing multiple loans and plans allowing only one loan. Results provided in the appendix 
show that few factors are statistically significant.23 In particular, household income and financial 
wealth did not influence whether a plan allowed multiple loans. Accordingly, we believe that 
plan sponsors did not establish plan loan policies in anticipation of participants’ observable 
characteristics associated with borrowing needs.  
  Nevertheless, there could be unobserved factors that could potentially affect plan loan 
policies including differences in underlying demand for credit, discount rates, or liquidity needs. 
To address this possibility, we hypothesize that if plans allowed multiple loans due to plan 
participant demand, then the proportion of participants holding multiple loans in those plans 
                                                 
23 See Appendix Table 2. 
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should be relatively large. Instead, we find that 86.2 percent of eligible borrowers took out no 
additional loans in plans allowing multiple loans; in other words only 14.8 percent took 
additional loans when allowed to do so. This result suggests that employer policy on multiple 
loans is not strongly tailored to unobserved loan demand. Another way to interpret this finding is 
to compare it with sequential borrowing in plans permitting only a single loan at a time. 
Sequential borrowers are defined to be those who take one loan at a time and then take a new 
loan after fully repaying the prior one. Those borrowers may have high loan demand yet they are 
constrained by the fact that the plan allows one loan at a time. In the latter plans, 13.9 percent of 
participants are sequential borrowers, a level rather similar to the 14.8 percent of multiple loan 
takers in plans allowing multiple loans. The similarity of these two results suggests that sponsors 
are not tailoring plan loan policy to employee characteristics. In sum, then, our findings appear 
robust to endogeneity considerations. 
 
VI. DETERMINANTS OF PLAN LOAN DEFAULTS  
Next we explore the determinants of 401(k) loan defaults via summary statistics in Table 
4. About one-fifth of loan-eligible employees in our sample had one or more loans outstanding. 
Among participants terminating employment with one or more loans outstanding, 86 percent 
failed to repay the outstanding balance due on their loans, on average; the remainder paid their 
account loans and hence avoided default. Since participants defaulting on their outstanding loan 
balances totaled around 10 percent of all participants with outstanding loans, we estimate that 
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about 90 percent of participants repaid their loans over the period during which we observed 
them.24     
Table 4 here 
Descriptive statistics on participants who defaulted versus repaid their loans are provided 
in Table 5, along with data on all borrowers and all loan-eligible plan participants. The default 
sample includes 151,458 participants in 401(k) plans who terminated employment with at least 
one loan outstanding.25 Compared to other plan borrowers, they were somewhat younger, had 
shorter job tenure, and held lower balances. Those who defaulted on their loans also had lower 
income, lower balances, and had less non-retirement wealth, than those who repaid their loans on 
job termination.   
Table 5 here  
To analyze loan defaults, we focus only on participants whose jobs terminated while they 
held plan loans.26 Our goal here is to compare employees who terminated employment and 
defaulted on their 401(k) loans, with those leaving employment who repaid their loans in full. 
We estimate a multivariate Probit model where the dependent variable, Di,j,t, refers to the 
probability of the individual defaulting; the mean of the dependent variable is 86 percent. 
                                                 
24 Ninety-five percent of the loans in our sample were general-purpose loans with a maximum term of five years.  
For this reason our five-year sample period offers a reasonable view of steady state default rates over time, though 
default rates might vary under different economic conditions. 
25 We exclude plans that changed record-keepers during the five-year period and also exclude participants 
associated with any "divisional transfer outs" during the period (e.g., when a division is sold and participant 
accounts are moved to another recordkeeper). We model a "divisional transfer-out” rule for each plan by calculating 
the monthly average number of participants terminating with a loan outstanding. If in a given month, the number of 
participant terminations exceeds 100, and it exceeds two times the average monthly plan terminations, we code the 
plan as having a “divisional transfer-out” that month and delete observations for those participants. In addition to 
IRS loan maximums, some employers impose their own more restrictive rules. Accordingly we eliminated 41 plans 
where no participant borrowed at the 50 percent limit over the five-year period. Borrowers who terminated 
employment with multiple loans outstanding are counted as a single observation. Fewer than 2 percent of 
terminating participants with outstanding loans paid off a portion of the outstanding loans and then defaulted on the 
remainder.   
26 Approximately 10% of plan sponsors allowed terminated plan participants to continue to repay their plan loans. 
However, in our dataset, only five percent took advantage of this feature (authors’ calculation). 
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Regressors are identical to those in our previous examination of loan probabilities and amounts 
borrowed. In addition, we also control for the borrower’s remaining outstanding loan balance.  
Results on loan default patterns appear in Table 6. Unlike before, we see that permitting 
participants to take multiple loans has no influence on default rates. The  statistically significant 
effects in Column 1 indicate that the young, low-income, and lower-wealth borrowers were more 
likely to default, though the coefficients indicate small economic magnitudes relative to the mean 
default rate. In Column 2, several interaction effects are significant, but the main effect on 
multiple loans is not, suggesting that having a multiple loan policy did influence loan defaults on 
job change. Loan interest rates were also not statistically significant, nor were the financial crisis 
flag and our measure of local labor market conditions. 
Table 6 here 
    While allowing multiple loans had no influence on default rates, such a policy could still 
have a different impact on single versus multiple-loan borrowers. To better understand the role 
that plan design plays in influencing default behavior, we categorized borrowers into three 
groups: (1) those allowed only one loan; (2) those permitted to take multiple loans, but who had 
a single loan outstanding; and (3) those with multiple loans. Since we control for the aggregate 
loan balance of each borrower on termination of employment, the coefficients of these variables 
should be statistically insignificant if the variation of default rates across groups is solely due to 
loan balance. By contrast if we found a significant effect of these regressors, it would suggest a 
relationship between the number of loans allowed and default behavior. Results appear in Table 
7.  Here we see that employees permitted to take multiple loans but who held just one loan were 
significantly less likely to default. By contrast, those participants having multiple loans were 
more likely to default, with a marginal increase of 1.7 percentage points in the default rate (or a 
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relative change of 2 percent relative to an 86 percent mean default rate, controlling on borrower 
aggregate loan balances). In other words, given two participants with the same 401(k) total debt, 
the employee who took one loan is less likely to default, compared to a participant with multiple 
loans. 
Table 7 here 
  These results imply that borrowers may exhibit some heterogeneity in their demand for 
credit or in their degree of self-control. For instance, participants with a single loan might have 
the foresight to anticipate a possible future default, or they might have more self-control, 
reserving the additional loan as a buffer for future borrowing. By contrast someone taking 
multiple loans might simply be more impatient; for instance, he may have taken out a first loan 
when first allowed to do so, but then as his account grew, he might have borrowed again. In 
other words, limiting the number of loans outstanding could lower default rates, though the effect 
is small. 
Since default rates are rather widespread among those leaving jobs with a loan, yet few of 
our control variables have economically meaningful effects on the mean default rate of 86 
percent, we conclude that other unobserved factors may be driving pension loan defaults. These 
could include financial illiteracy, discounting, or lack of self-control.27 In our context, this could 
mean that many employees taking plan loans were simply unaware of the consequences of job 
termination for their 401(k) loans.  
 
VII. AGGREGATE LOAN LEAKAGE  
                                                 
27 For instance, the least financially savvy tend to be unaware of how much debt they hold (Lusardi and Tufano 
(2009); also Agarwal and Mazumder (2013) show that financial mistakes are most prevalent for the least cognitively 
adept. Present-biased people are also more likely to have credit-card and general debt than those with lower discount 
rates (Meier and Springer 2010). And Mastrobuoni and Weinberg (2009) find some Social Security beneficiaries 
suffer from low self-control, resulting in low saving. 
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    In recent years, several policymakers have proposed legislation to restrict retirement plan 
losses including plan loans.28 In light of this interest, we use our empirical findings to estimate 
the aggregate amount of loan default leakage flowing from 401(k) plans annually.  
The primary data source used to address this question to date has been the Private 
Pension Plan Bulletin, an abstract of the Form 5500 Annual Reports which retirement plans must 
file with the Employee Benefits Security Administration of the US Department of Labor 
(USDOL 2012). One item reported in this document refers to the “Income Statement of Pension 
Plans with 100 or More Participants” and it lists the amount of “deemed distribution of 
participant loans.” Some analysts have incorrectly interpreted this amount as representing the 
total amount of loan defaults,29 yet this number actually measures loan defaults only for active 
plan members due to temporary lay-off, long-term disability, maternity leave, or a leave of 
absence such as parental leave. Loan defaults due to job termination are instead recorded as 
offsets to participants’ account balances at the time of default, reported as “direct benefit 
payments” in the Labor Department’s nomenclature.   
In our dataset, only eight percent of the loan defaults observed were “deemed” loan 
distributions; the remaining 92 percent resulted from defaults on job termination (the latter being 
the focus of our main analysis). Accordingly, data on “deemed distributions” seriously 
understates the total value of loan defaults. Applying our sample fractions to the entire private 
401(k) system indicates that aggregate system-wide loan defaults are on the order of $6 billion 
per year, or ten times the $600 million in “deemed” loan distributions.30 This is smaller than the 
                                                 
28For example, U.S. Senators Kohl and Enzi proposed the 2011 Savings Enhancement by Alleviating Leakage in 
401(k) Savings Act (SEAL Act). In their press release the Senators remarked that “[a] 401(k) savings account 
should not be used as a piggy bank” (Leonard, 2011).   
29 This number is reported in the GAO estimate of loan leakages (GAO, 1997). 
30 During our five year period, we see about 130,000 loan defaults with an aggregate annual defaulted loan balance 
of around $0.156 billion. In 2006 there were 58.4 million active 401(k) participants (USDOL 2013), and assuming 
90 percent had access to plan loans, this implies that about 52.5 million workers were eligible to take 401(k) loans 
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leakage from account cash-outs on job termination of $74 billion (in 2006; GAO 2009) though 
not inconsequential. Assuming an effective tax rate of 10 percent and factoring in the 10 percent 
penalty associated with early distributions, we estimate that the tax revenue flowing to the U.S. 
Government associated with defaulted DC plan loans to be over $1 billion per year.  
 
VIII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION  
More than two decades ago, Nobel Prize winner Franco Modigliani patented a method for 
issuing 401(k) credit cards with the aim of making it easier for workers to withdraw from their 
retirement accounts to cover short-term consumption needs (Vise, 2004).  Although the idea of 
401(k) credit cards faded under criticism, that proposal highlighted the dual-purpose nature of 
U.S. defined contribution plans. DC retirement accounts, which represent a growing fraction of 
US household wealth, are in essence dual-purpose, being used both to finance old-age retirement 
security and also to help cover current consumption needs. The loan feature is one of the 
prominent pre-retirement liquidity features of 401(k) plans permitting current spending.  
Our study has focused on the effects of employer plan loan policy, and we conclude that 
loan policy is economically meaningful in shaping participant borrowing. In our dataset, 
one-fifth of plan participants had a loan at any given time, while almost 40 percent did so over a 
five-year period. Most importantly, when a plan allowed participants to take out multiple loans, 
participants were more likely to borrow in the first place, while individual loan amounts shrank. 
This suggests a buffer-stock approach to credit, similar to that found among users of credit cards. 
That is, given the ability to borrow multiple times, workers seem more willing to take the first 
                                                                                                                                                             
that year. Extrapolating from our 1.3 million person sample provides an estimate of $6.3 billion for total 401(k) 
annual defaults. Alternatively, if we were to use a count of 65.8 million participants for all private DC plans, this 
would raise the estimate to $7.1 billion, although it is unclear whether plan borrowing in non-401(k) plans is as high 
as in 401(k) plans. 
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loan when they retain slack borrowing capacity for future consumption shocks. Moreover, in 
multiple-loan plans, participants borrow greater amounts in aggregate, suggesting that they view 
the multiple-loan feature as an employer endorsement of borrowing. Although our paper has not 
explicitly evaluated a Modigliani-like proposal for a 401(k) credit card, a concern about 
enhancing 401(k) access is that it might boost this endorsement effect. 
With our dataset we are uniquely able to assess loan default patterns. We show that nine 
of 10 loans are repaid, yet when workers with an outstanding loan balance terminate 
employment, 86 percent of them default on their loans. Although more liquidity-constrained 
participants are more likely to default, the size of these effects is small relative to the high default 
rate broadly. This finding implies that other factors, such as low financial literacy, impatience, or 
inattention, may be at work: many borrowers may simply be surprised by an unanticipated job 
change and its effect on an outstanding 401(k) loan.  Another finding is that holding multiple 
loans at the time of job change is associated with more defaults, although the size of the effect is 
small. This effect is statistically significant after controlling for aggregate loan balances, 
implying unobserved heterogeneity of credit demand and self-control among these groups of 
borrowers. This phenomenon has not been previously documented in studies of credit card loan 
delinquency.  
Finally, we estimate the aggregate effect of loan defaults on retirement savings at 
approximately $6 billion per year. This estimate is larger higher than previous estimates which 
relied on incomplete data, though it is still much smaller than retirement plan leakage due to 
account cash-outs on job termination. 
Our research findings should be of interest to policymakers and plan sponsors seeking to 
evaluate the effectiveness of access features in U.S DC retirement plans. The fact that many 
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workers do borrow from and default on their plans has led some to argue that 401(k) loans 
should be restricted.31 Based on our results, those concerns seem overstated, particularly when 
compared to leakage from account cash-outs upon job change. We do, however, find that 
limiting the number of loans to a single one would be likely to reduce the incidence of borrowing 
and the fraction of total wealth borrowed, thereby reducing the impact of future defaults. Another 
option might be to limit the size and scope of loans in an effort to reduce the total dollars of loan 
default leakage.32 For example, participant loans could be restricted to only a quarter of account 
balances. These findings underscore the fact that DC retirement accounts are intended mainly for 
old-age financial security, although they do offer pre-retirement liquidity to meet current 
consumption needs. 
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31 For instance, see Reeves and Villareal (2008), and Weller and Wenger (2008). 
32 Vanderhei’s (2014) simulation results also indicated that retirement balances would be greatly increased if plan 
loan defaults were substantially reduced or eliminated. 
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Table 1.  Characteristics of 401(k) Loan-Eligible Participants and Borrowers 
 
  Loan-Eligible 
Participants  
Borrowers 
Outcomes of Interest   
% Participants taking new loan 1.38 N/A 
Loan amount ($) N/A $7,841  
Aggregate Loan amount ($) N/A $9,969  
Plan Factors   
% Multiple loans allowed 48 57 
% Loan interest rate 7.16 7.29 
Demographic Controls   
Age  44.68 41.58 
% AgeLT35 20.19 26.51 
% Age35-45 27.84 33.87 
% Age45-55 32.01 29.52 
% AgeGE55 19.97 10.11 
% Male  51.81 44.91 
Tenure  8.63 8.24 
% TenureLT2  17.88 15.24 
% Tenure2-6 29.71 33.2 
% Tenure6-12 28.08 29.03 
% TenureGE12 24.32 22.52 
Financial Controls   
% IncomeLT35K 7.97 13.86 
% Income35-87.K5 48.84 59.99 
% IncomeGT87.5K 43.19 26.15 
% Low wealth 42.97 64.92 
% Medium wealth 31.24 24.79 
% High wealth 25.79 10.29 
Account balance ($) 86,541  44,482  
Ln Account balance ($) 10.38 9.83 
Macro Controls   
% Financial turmoil 18.98 16.27 
% Lagged state unemployment rate 5.31 5.27 
# Observations 55,175,718 784,489 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Table 2.  Determinants of the Probability of Taking a New Loan 
 
 Dependent Variable: Probability of Taking a New Loan  
 (1)  (2)  
 Estimate (SE) Marginal 
effect 
Estimate (SE) Marginal 
effect 
Plan design factors     
Multiple loans allowed (dummy) 0.169*** (0.029) 2.7% 0.255*** (0.047) 4.3% 
Loan interest rate (%) -0.006        (0.004) -0.1% -0.006        (0.004) -0.1% 
     
Participant characteristics      
Age 35-45 0.042*** (0.010) 0.7% 0.067*** (0.012) 1.1% 
Age 45-55 -0.032**   (0.014) -0.5% -0.014        (0.016) -0.2% 
Age > 55 -0.245*** (0.016) -3.5% -0.250*** (0.019) -3.8% 
Male -0.030*** (0.010) -0.5% 0.007        (0.017) 0.1% 
Tenure < 2 years -0.336*** (0.022) -4.6% -0.278*** (0.026) -4.1% 
Tenure 2-6 years -0.113*** (0.014) -1.7% -0.104*** (0.020) -1.7% 
Tenure > 12 years 0.046*** (0.009) 0.7% 0.056*** (0.015) 1.0% 
Income < $35,000 0.107*** (0.005) 1.8% 0.096*** (0.007) 1.7% 
Income > $87,500 -0.109*** (0.005) -1.7% -0.130*** (0.008) -2.1% 
Low wealth 0.185*** (0.006) 3.0% 0.203*** (0.007) 3.4% 
High wealth -0.160*** (0.005) -2.4% -0.170*** (0.007) -2.7% 
Ln (401(k) account balance) -0.116*** (0.008) -0.5% -0.117*** (0.008) -0.5% 
     
Macroeconomic variables     
Financial turmoil period -0.038**  (0.018) -0.6% -0.039**  (0.017) -0.6% 
Lagged state-level unemployment rate 0.007       (0.006) 0.1% 0.007       (0.006) 0.1% 
     
Interactions     
Age 35-45*multiple loans   -0.043**   (0.017)  -0.7% 
Age 45-55*multiple loans   -0.031        (0.024) -0.5% 
Age > 55*multiple loans   0.011        (0.030) 0.2% 
Male * multiple loans   -0.066**   (0.027) -1.1% 
Tenure < 2 yrs * multiple loans   -0.112*** (0.028) -1.7% 
Tenure 2-6 yrs * multiple loans   -0.017        (0.024) -0.3% 
Tenure > 12 yrs * multiple loans   -0.020        (0.019) -0.3% 
Income < $35,000 * multiple loans    0.021**   (0.010) 0.4% 
Income > $87,500 * multiple loans    0.038*** (0.009) 0.6% 
Low wealth * multiple loans    -0.033*** (0.010) -0.5% 
High wealth * multiple loans   0.018*      (0.010) 0.3% 
Number of observations 55,175,718  55,175,718  
Mean of dependent variable 0.014                       0.014   
R-squared 0.01                      0.01   
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; models include plan size and sector controls. 
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Table 3.  Determinants of New Loan Size and Aggregate Amount Borrowed  
  
Dep. variable: ln (New loan amount $) 
Dep. variable:ln (Aggregate amount 
borrowed $)   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) 
Plan design factors         
Multiple loans allowed (dummy) -0.207*** (0.029) -0.104*** (0.032) 0.150*** (0.025) 0.075*** (0.029) 
Loan interest rate (%) 0.004        (0.004) 0.003        (0.004) 0.003        (0.004) 0.003        (0.004) 
          
Participant characteristics         
Age 35-45 0.091*** (0.010) 0.167*** (0.020) 0.112*** (0.012) 0.044**   (0.019) 
Age 45-55 0.059*** (0.014) 0.152*** (0.025) 0.085*** (0.015) 0.028        (0.026) 
Age > 55 -0.008        (0.019) 0.068*      (0.036) -0.001        (0.020) -0.050        (0.035) 
Male  0.048*** (0.011) 0.109*** (0.026) 0.043*** (0.011) 0.075*** (0.023) 
Tenure < 2 years -0.109*** (0.023) -0.209*** (0.047) -0.257*** (0.025) -0.225*** (0.051) 
Tenure 2-6 years -0.067*** (0.017) -0.074*** (0.028) -0.118*** (0.020) -0.171*** (0.035) 
Tenure > 12 years -0.071*** (0.026) 0.008        (0.048) -0.049**   (0.024) -0.032        (0.054) 
Income < $35,000  -0.039*** (0.006) -0.005        (0.020) -0.043*** (0.007) -0.081*** (0.029) 
Income > $87,500 0.048*** (0.007) 0.140*** (0.018) 0.041*** (0.007) 0.083*** (0.023) 
Low wealth -0.064*** (0.008) -0.048*      (0.027) -0.061*** (0.008) -0.169*** (0.026) 
High wealth 0.052*** (0.007) 0.150*** (0.016) 0.046*** (0.007) 0.075*** (0.018) 
Ln (401(k) account balance) 0.604*** (0.014) 0.605*** (0.014) 0.589*** (0.015) 0.588*** (0.015) 
          
Macroeconomic variables         
Financial turmoil period 0.015      (0.018) 0.013      (0.017) 0.015      (0.018) 0.016      (0.019) 
Lagged state-level unemployment 
rate 
0.011      (0.007) 0.011*    (0.006) 0.012**  (0.006) 0.012** (0.006) 
          
Interactions         
Age 35-45*multiple loans   -0.041*** (0.009)   0.036***  (0.011) 
Age 45-55*multiple loans   -0.048*** (0.011)   0.030**    (0.013) 
Age greater than 55*multiple loans   -0.040*** (0.015)   0.026*      (0.015) 
Male * multiple loans   -0.035*** (0.013)   -0.018*      (0.010) 
Tenure < 2 yrs * multiple loans   0.059*** (0.021)   -0.020        (0.022) 
Tenure 2-6 yrs * multiple loans   0.004        (0.011)   0.028*      (0.014) 
Tenure > 12 yrs * multiple loans   -0.038        (0.025)   -0.009        (0.029) 
Income < $35,000 * multiple loans    -0.019*      (0.011)   0.022        (0.016) 
Income > $87,500 * multiple loans    -0.048*** (0.009)   -0.022**   (0.011) 
Low wealth * multiple loans    -0.009        (0.012)   0.058*** (0.011) 
High wealth * multiple loans   -0.051*** (0.008)   -0.015        (0.009) 
Number of observations 784,489 784,489 784,489 784,489 
Mean of dependent variable 8.419 8.419 8.663 8.663 
R-Squared 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.60 
 
 Source: Authors' calculations; models include plan size and sector controls.
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Table 4. Default Patterns from 401(k) Loans: Full Period and by Year 
 
 
 Period 
Total 
7/04-6/05 7/05-6/06 7/06-6/07 7/07-6/08 7/08-6/09 
Number of active participants 6,590,888 1,102,478 1,206,118 1,331,802 1,490,111 1,460,379 
% of active participants with a loan outstanding 20.6 21.5 21.0 20.7 19.6 20.3 
       
Terminations       
% of those with a loan terminating 11.2 10.3 11.0 10.6 10.6 13.1 
       
Default rates       
% of those terminating with a loan who default 86.0 84.8 84.2 85.4 87.3 87.6 
% of defaults as a fraction of loans outstanding 9.6 8.7 9.3 9.1 9.3 11.5 
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Table 5. Characteristics of Participants Defaulting on, or Repaying, Their Loans on 
Leaving Their Jobs  
  
 All 
Participants 
Participants 
with a Loan 
Participants Terminating 
with Outstanding Loans 
    All Defaulting Repaying 
Number of observations 6,590,888 1,354,900  151,458 130,295 21,163 
       
Plan design factors       
Multiple loans allowed (%) 43.3 49.7  47.6 47.1 50.6 
# Loans taken N/A 1.3  1.3 1.3 1.2 
Loan interest rate (%) 6.89 6.88  7.04 7.07 6.85 
       
Participant characteristics       
Mean age 43.6 44.1  42.9 42.4 46.1 
Male (%)  49.0 51.0  48.0 48.0 53.0 
Mean tenure 8.0 10.5  8.6 8.1 11.3 
       
Mean income (%) 84,371 73,252  67,369 64,958  81,503 
Low wealth (%) 50 64  65 67 52 
Medium wealth (%) 29 25  24 24 29 
High wealth (%) 21 11  11 10 19 
       
Mean account balance ($) 73,248 63,780  43,667 35,415  94,716 
Loan balance ($) N/A 8,132  6,318 6,099  7,663 
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Table 6.  Determinants of the Probability of Participants Defaulting on 401(k) Plan 
Loans Outstanding 
 Dependent Variable: Probability of Participant Defaulting on Plan 
Loans Outstanding 
 (1)  (2)  
 Estimate (SE) Marginal 
Effect 
Estimate (SE) Marginal 
Effect 
Plan design factors     
Multiple loans allowed (dummy) -0.078       (0.051) -1.0% -0.040        (0.076) -0.5% 
Loan interest rate (%) 0.010*     (0.006) 0.1% 0.010        (0.006) 0.1% 
Participant characteristics     
Age 35-45 -0.039**   (0.018) 0.5% 0.053        (0.044) 0.7% 
Age 45-55 -0.062**   (0.025) 0.8% 0.036        (0.049) 0.5% 
Age > 55 -0.000        (0.030)  0.017        (0.056) 0.2% 
Male 0.015        (0.016) 0.2% 0.072**    (0.034) 1.0% 
Tenure < 2 years 0.027        (0.034) 0.4% -0.043        (0.066) -0.6% 
Tenure 2-6 years 0.053**   (0.022) 0.7% 0.008        (0.050) 0.1% 
Tenure > 12 years -0.043*      (0.026) -0.5% -0.053        (0.048) -0.7% 
Income < $35,000 0.072*** (0.016) 1.0% 0.025        (0.033) 0.3% 
Income > $87,500 -0.121*** (0.013) -1.5% -0.118*** (0.028) -1.5% 
Low wealth 0.147*** (0.013) 1.8% 0.122*** (0.034) 1.6% 
High wealth -0.158*** (0.017) -1.8% -0.176*** (0.042) -2.1% 
Ln (401(k) account balance) -0.389*** (0.016) -1.9% -0.389*** (0.016) -2.0% 
Ln Loan balance 0.276*** (0.013) 1.1% 0.276*** (0.013) 1.1% 
Macroeconomic variables     
Financial turmoil period -0.007        (0.040) -0.1% -0.008        (0.040) -0.1% 
Lagged state-level unemployment rate -0.005        (0.011) -0.1% -0.005        (0.011) -0.1% 
     
Interactions     
Age 35-45*multiple loans   -0.056**   (0.027) -4.4% 
Age 45-55*multiple loans   -0.059**   (0.028) -4.5% 
Age > 55*multiple loans   -0.011        (0.032) -1.1% 
Male * multiple loans   -0.035*      (0.021) -3.1% 
Tenure < 2 yrs * multiple loans   0.045        (0.039) 6.1% 
Tenure 2-6 yrs * multiple loans   0.028        (0.030) 3.3% 
Tenure > 12 yrs * multiple loans   0.006        (0.025) 0.7% 
Income < $35,000 * multiple loans    0.030        (0.019) 3.7% 
Income > $87,500 * multiple loans    -0.001        (0.015) -0.2% 
Low wealth * multiple loans    0.015        (0.019) 1.7% 
High wealth * multiple loans   0.011        (0.022) 1.2% 
Number of observations 151,458  151,458   
Mean of dependent variable (%)                         0.86   0.86   
R-squared                         0.12   0.12   
 
Source: Authors' calculations; models include plan size and sector controls. 
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Table 7. Determinants of the Probability of Loan Defaults: Extended Model 
   
 Estimate (SE) Marginal Effect 
Plan design factors   
# loans allowed > 1, #loans taken > 1 
(dummy) 
0.130**   (0.061) 1.7% 
# loans allowed > 1, #loans taken = 1 
(dummy) 
-0.193*** (0.049) -2.2% 
Loan interest rate (%) 0.010        (0.006) 0.1% 
Participant characteristics   
Age 35-45 -0.041**   (0.018) -0.5% 
Age 45-55 -0.065**   (0.025) -0.8% 
Age > 55 0.002        (0.030) 0.0% 
Male 0.020        (0.015) 0.2% 
Tenure < 2 years 0.063*      (0.034) 0.8% 
Tenure 2-6 years 0.062*** (0.022) 0.8% 
Tenure > 12 years -0.044*      (0.026) -0.5% 
Income < $35,000 0.069*** (0.016) 0.9% 
Income > $87,500 -0.115*** (0.013) -1.4% 
Low wealth 0.141*** (0.013) 1.7% 
High wealth -0.151*** (0.017) -1.7% 
Ln (401(k) account balance) -0.375*** (0.016) -1.8% 
Ln Loan balance ($) 0.255*** (0.014) 1.0% 
Macroeconomic variables   
Financial turmoil period -0.002       (0.041) 0.0% 
Lagged state-level unemployment rate -0.005       (0.011) -0.1% 
Number of observations 151,458   
Mean of dependent variable (%) 0.86   
R-squared 0.12  
 
 Source: Authors' calculations; models include plan size and sector controls. 
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Figure 1.  Percentage of Participants with 401(k) Loans Outstanding 
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Figure 2.  Loan Incidence by Number of Plan Loans 
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Appendix Table 1. Description of Explanatory and Control Variables 
Variables Descriptions 
Plan design factors  
Multiple loans allowed (dummy) 1 if a plan permits participants holding multiple loans, 0 otherwise 
Loan interest rate (%) Plan loan interest rate charged by a plan in a given month  
Participant characteristics  
Age < 35 Reference group. 1 if a participant ages below 35 years, 0 otherwise 
Age 35-45 1 if a participant ages between 35 and 45 years, 0 otherwise 
Age 45-55 1 if a participant ages between 45 and 55 years, 0 otherwise 
Age > 55 1 if a participant ages above 55 years, 0 otherwise 
Male 1 if a participant is male, 0 otherwise 
Tenure < 2 years 1 if a participant joins the plan less than 2 years, 0 otherwise 
Tenure 2-6 years 1 if a participant joins the plan from 2 to 6 years, 0 otherwise 
Tenure 6-12 years Reference group. 1 if a participant joins the plan from 6 to 12 years, 0 otherwise 
Tenure > 12 years 1 if a participant joins the plan longer than 12 years, 0 otherwise 
Income < $35,000 1 if a particiant's household income is less than $35,000, 0 otherwise 
Income $35,000 - $87,500 Reference group. 1 if a particiant's household income is between $35,000 and 
$87,500, 0 otherwise 
Income > $87,500 1 if a particiant's household income is more than $87,500, 0 otherwise 
Low wealth We use data from the IXI company to impute non-retirement household financial 
wealth at the ZIP+4 level. The data, which are categorical in nature, are collapsed 
into three groupings. The low wealth dummy takes value 1 if a participant has IXI 
imputed wealth less than $7,280, 0 otherwise 
Medium wealth Reference group. 1 if a participant has IXI imputed wealth between $7,280 and 
$61,289, 0 otherwise 
High wealth 1 if a participant has IXI imputed wealth more than $61,289, 0 otherwise 
Ln (401(k) account balance) The natural log of a participant's 401(k) account balance in a given month, 
standardized in 2010 dollar 
Ln Loan balance ($) The natural log of a 401(k) borrower's total outstanding loan balance in a given 
month, standardized in 2010 dollar 
Macroeconomic variables  
Financial turmoil period 1 if the time is between September 2008 and June 2009, 0 otherwise 
Lagged state-level unemployment 
rate 
In month t, the average state-level unemployment rate of months t-1, t-2, t-3 
Other control variables 
# plan participants The number of plan participants in a given month, divided by 10,000 for 
normalization. Results not shown. 
Industry dummies We categorize plans in 10 different industries: manufacture, agriculture, 
transportation, finance, retail, media, business, education, public, and others. Each 
plan takes value 1 in its own corresponding industry, and 0 in others. The 
manufacture industry is treated as reference group. Results not shown. 
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Appendix Table 2. Impacts of Plan and Plan Participant Characteristics on the 
Probability of Plan Offering Multiple Loans 
 
   
   
 Estimate (SE) Marginal 
Effect 
# Plan participants -0.000     (0.001) 0.0% 
Plan average age -0.007     (0.011) -0.3% 
Plan standard deviation of age -0.014     (0.016) -0.5% 
Plan average tenure 0.040** (0.016) 1.5% 
Plan standard deviation of tenure 0.004     (0.019) 0.1% 
% Low income participants in plan (< $35,000) 1.067     (0.799) 40.5% 
% High income participants in plan (> $87,500) -0.131     (0.276) -4.9% 
% Low wealth participants in plan -0.386     (0.278) -13.8% 
% High wealth participants in plan -0.010     (0.369) -0.4% 
Industry Controls Yes  
Number of observations 822  
R-squared 0.03  
 
 
